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The Bigger Threat
Version of which appeared in the Los
Angeles Times, February 3, 2003
By Shibley Telhami
In his State of the Union address,
President Bush declared that "the gravest danger in the
war on terror facing America and the world is outlaw
regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons."
These threats are indeed serious and require a response.
But elevating them to our top priority masks our
inability to grasp that the greatest challenge from the
terrorist threat today resides outside the control of
states -- even menacing ones.
The focus on hostile states like Iraq and North Korea is
inevitably undermining our ability to confront the true
dangers to our national security: shadowy, nonstate
global groups like Al Qaeda that are increasingly able
to organize and to seek weapons of mass destruction.
This danger of global groups that are outside the
control of any state is far greater than the danger of
local militant groups or the states friendly to them.
In fact, the road to war now being followed may lead to
even greater dangers by unwittingly creating conditions
favorable to these groups.
While the U.S. has the power to deter or defeat the most
powerful states -- having faced Stalinist Russia and
Maoist China -- it cannot effectively counter nonstate
groups in the globalization era without considerable
global cooperation.
Even local militant nonstate groups proliferate more
where central authority is weak. Consider the behavior
of such groups in the Middle East. Their ability to
operate and thrive is enhanced by the severe instability
of certain regions. The groups attacking Israelis, for
example, have proliferated in the last several decades
in areas of hardship-especially occupation--where
central authority is the weakest: Lebanon and the
occupied Palestinian territories.
By comparison, in states that are most hostile to
Israel, such as Syria -- whose Golan Heights remain
under Israeli occupation -- direct operations against
Israel have been minimal. The reason? Israel has the
ability to deter Syria, which is sensitive to Israel's
greater power.
But it is much harder to know whom to punish in places
like Lebanon, where the government does not have the
capacity to control dispersed nonstate groups.
As a result, significant deployments of Israel's
military forces, including occupation of Lebanese
territories in the 1980s and 1990s, have failed to
defeat or fully deter militant groups or undermine their
motivation.
Certainly many governments support nonstate militant
groups when it suits them. But because they are
sensitive to deterrence and punishment by more powerful
states, they set limits.
For example, both Syria and Iran have supported
Hezbollah in Lebanon--whose cause they see as just. Yet
although Hezbollah has attacked Israeli targets --
mostly Israeli soldiers on or near Lebanese soil -- the
group has not unleashed suicide bombers to kill Israeli
civilians in Tel Aviv. Had it done so, the consequences
for Syria could have been severe.
The real and haunting danger is that global terrorist
groups like Al Qaeda that are independent of any state
will acquire weapons of mass destruction.
Most proliferation experts agree that the most likely
source of such weapons would not be governments -- even
malevolent ones -- but lawless areas in failing states,
such as some nations of the former Soviet Union or even
Pakistan if its government collapses. Rather than being
primarily an instrument of states, terrorism is the
anti-state.
Those who committed the horror of 9/11 -- none
of whom came from "terrorist states" -- did so with
nothing more than box cutters and a willingness to die.
States were hardly essential players.
Even today, after the defeat of the Taliban and the
significant resources that have been deployed, Al Qaeda
remains on the loose, with Osama bin Laden possibly
surviving to kill another day. Where do most of Al
Qaeda's fighters hide? Mainly in states that are now our
allies, Afghanistan and Pakistan, in areas that are not
fully under control.
Instability is the home of terrorism.
The train of war against Iraq may have already left the
station. Yet we must not allow the prospect of watching
the defeat of a ruthless dictator to blind us to the
possible consequences: more regional instability, more
potential recruitment of motivated militants and more
reluctance by states around the world to cooperate with
anti-terror efforts when the U.S. needs global
cooperation the most.
In the end, we must ask ourselves this question: Is the
downfall of Saddam Hussein worth the rise of another Bin
Laden?
Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and
Development at the University of Maryland and a senior
fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution,
is author of "The Stakes: America and the Middle East" (Westview
Press, 2002).
Copyright © 2003,
Los Angeles Times
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