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The US's Mideast Disconnect
By Shibley Telhami
Christian Science Monitor
April 15, 2002
WASHINGTON - Secretary of State
Colin Powell took a highly visible and important trip
around the Middle East last week, marred by unabated
casualties and destruction. But as he wound his way to
Israel, his mission demonstrated how disconnected the
Washington debate has become from the rapidly changing
environment in the region.
It's not clear whether the Bush
administration sent Mr. Powell to Arab countries before
Israel to give Israeli forces time to withdraw from
Palestinian cities. Surely, though, there was another
logic to the itinerary: to show that President Bush's
demand for Israeli withdrawal has not undermined his
determination that Arab leaders – especially Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat – stand publicly to condemn
suicide bombings unequivocally, then use this Arab
position to strengthen his demand for Israeli withdrawal.
The problem is that in focusing on
appearances, Washington lost sight of the fast-moving
events, and of the real aim of US demands on Arab leaders:
to help delegitimize terrorism in the minds of an outraged
Arab public. While Israelis rolled their tanks through
Palestinian towns and refugee camps, Arab leaders would
have delegitimized themselves with their people, had they
responded to Powell without seeing an end to Israeli
operations. This would have made it more difficult for the
leaders to confront terrorism and push forward toward
peace later.
Washington is not paying sufficient
attention to how the public in the Middle East – and
globally – sees the events of the last two weeks. Arab
satellite television stations and other world media carry
live pictures of the horror in Palestinian cities and live
phone calls from Palestinian men and women calling events
massacres and atrocities – in the same way that Israeli
media focus on the horrible deaths of innocent Israelis.
Coverage of Israeli tanks and dead
Palestinians is sprinkled with pictures from the 1982
Sabra and Shatila massacre for which Arabs blame Ariel
Sharon, then Israel's defense minister. Callers from all
over the Arab and Muslim worlds brand Arab leaders
"servants of America and Israel."
Breaking news reports such things as
the destruction of a mosque in the West Bank town of
Nablus, accompanied by a commentary about the impotence of
Arabs and Muslims to respond. Other callers recommend
surrounding not US embassies but security forces in the
Arab world, to humiliate them for their inability to act.
People who still want to believe Arab governments can do
more call upon them to sever all ties with Israel, boycott
American products, and declare an oil embargo.
Arab and Muslim publics see a US
green light for Ariel Sharon. In this environment – which
has already led to mass demonstrations across Arab and
Muslim countries – it is hard to see how the Arab public
would take its leaders seriously if they stood beside
Powell to condemn Palestinian terrorism, while Israeli
tanks remain in Palestinian cities. Their own authority
would have been undermined instead.
At the outset of the Israeli
operations, no image seemed more extraordinary in the
region than the American demand of Mr. Arafat to "do
more:" Israeli forces had just destroyed much of Arafat's
headquarters and cut off water and electricity to his
compound. Israeli soldiers were down the hall from his
office, and gunfire was heard all around – televised to
the world.
President Bush declares to the world
that Arafat can still "do more," saying nothing about the
actions of Ariel Sharon. While there may be a legitimate
factual debate about Arafat's actual capabilities, the
images themselves were highly perplexing to people in the
region.
The Bush administration faces
extraordinary challenges. First, the US must not
underestimate the humanitarian disaster that has just
taken place, with hundreds of casualties, including women
and children, destroyed infrastructure, and a psychology
of despair on the Palestinian side. On the Israeli side,
suicide bombings have killed many innocents and created an
environment of fear. To expect that Arafat and Mr. Sharon
or any other Palestinian and Israeli leaders will be able
to negotiate a cease-fire and enforce it is asking for
miracles.
Second, the focus on Arafat as if he
is now a key to peace or war distracts from the magnitude
of the US challenge: disruptions across the Arab world,
possible spillover of the conflict to other fronts,
especially with Lebanon and Syria, and gathering momentum
toward broad confrontation between the US and Muslim
countries. No one stands to gain from such confrontation.
To imagine that Arafat is able to
prevent the unfortunate but pervasive propensity for
revenge among Palestinians is to set US diplomacy up for
failure before it begins. And to base the US debate about
policy options on whether or not Arafat will be "rewarded"
or "punished" is to ignore a historic responsibility the
United States now has, affecting the future of Middle East
peace and US relations with the region.
It is hard to envision a return to
incremental diplomacy. A cease-fire agreement is unlikely
to hold without knowing what follows, and the trust of the
parties toward each other is at an all-time low. What's
left is a top-down approach: an American plan, backed by
the UN Security Council, that defines the parameters of a
settlement. It is an approach that broadens the process
beyond Arafat and Sharon, without ignoring them, and puts
the choice in front of their people to hold them
accountable.
Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat
Professor for Peace and Development at the University of
Maryland and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
Copyright © 2002,
The Christian Science Monitor
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