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Repression Not Democracy in the
Middle East is the Likely Outcome of War
By Shibley Telhami
:Los Angeles Times
March 10, 2003
Within days of President Bush's
speech articulating a vision of democracy in the Middle
East after a war with Iraq, a sobering reality set in.
The powerful security forces of the
authoritarian government in Pakistan delivered the most
important catch to date in the war on Al Qaeda: Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, the possible mastermind of the 9/11
terrorist attacks.
They were able to do it because
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has put everything on
the line to back the U.S. war on Al Qaeda -- even though
it means challenging the passions of significant portions
of his public.
Similarly, in the Arab world, most
authoritarian governments, whose populations are
overwhelmingly opposed to such a war, have decided to
cooperate with the American effort anyway.
And it is the very absence of
democracy that has enabled these authoritarian governments
to respond to Washington's unpopular requests.
In contrast, Turkey -- the one Muslim
democracy in the Middle East, a member of NATO and usually
a staunch American ally, a country offered billions of
dollars in American aid to say yes -- said no to American
forces on its soil.
The reason was clear: Even its
Islamist-supported government, which backed the presence
of American troops, could not persuade the democratic
parliament to overlook the fact that nine out of 10 Turks
oppose the war.
Democracy spoke.
These trends are symptomatic of the
history of American relations with the Middle East, which
often have inclined Washington to follow policies that had
the consequence of bolstering authoritarianism.
Whatever the intent, a war with Iraq
is likely to perpetuate repression in the Middle East, not
spread democracy, at least in the short term.
The pattern is clear. As we pursue
policies that are highly unpopular in the Middle East, we
ask, indeed insist, that governments support these
policies.
To accomplish this, those governments
unleash their security forces to prevent dissent, to
contain public demonstrations, to limit freedom of speech,
to disrupt any potential organization from undermining
their stability. In the case of war in Iraq, the regimes
fear that passions could be inflamed if there are many
civilian casualties, so they plan ahead with particular
ruthlessness. More and more of their resources go to
keeping the security forces strong and happy -- resources
that are enhanced by the deals that we make to gain their
support.
Consider the facts as Washington's
preparations for an Iraq war accelerate today. The public
in Arab and Muslim countries remains passionately opposed
to the war. Many authoritarian governments in the region
have decided that it is easier for them to resist their
publics than to resist Washington.
These regimes have begun preparing
for war by unleashing their security services to stifle
dissent, including in places such as Jordan, where the
government genuinely believes that it is in its long-term
interest to liberalize its political system. The regimes
see their stability, even survival, to be on the line.
Certainly, some governments try to
launch public information campaigns to reduce the public's
anger. Jordan, for example, began a campaign in November
declaring that "Jordan is first," meaning that the kingdom
would not allow the issue of Iraq to undermine its vital
interests.
Egypt's official media have begun to
shift the blame for possible war to Iraq so as to reduce
the anger against the United States and thus against the
Egyptian government for cooperating with the U.S.
These measures make some difference,
but a lot less than they used to because, with the advent
of satellite television broadcasting, governments no
longer monopolize information in the region.
The more access the public has to
information, the less effective the government's spin. In
fully democratic countries like Spain, Italy and Britain,
the determined efforts of national leaders to support the
war have had little effect on public opinion, which
remains strongly opposed.
The consequences of war are
unpredictable, and there may be some pleasant surprises.
More likely, however, U.S. success in helping forge a new
government in Baghdad that respects human rights is likely
to be modest. It is also likely that a modest success
story in Iraq -- enabled by a large American occupation
force in a key Arab state -- will not be seen as an
inspiring model.
Democracy has to grow from within,
and any strategy that ignores public sentiment while
trying to nurture it is doomed to fail.
Shibley Telhami is a professor at the University of
Maryland, senior fellow at the Saban Center of the
Brookings Institution and author of "The Stakes: America
and the Middle East" (Westview Press, 2002)
Copyright © 2003,
Los Angeles Times
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